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Abstract 
IT security outsourcing is the establishment of a contractual relationship with an outside vendor to assume 
responsibility for one or more security functions. Whereas Information System (IS) outsourcing generally has 
been thoroughly examined in the theoretical literature little or no attention has been paid to system security in 
this regard. This paper examines a body of data, which has been collected to build a Soft System Methodology  
(SSM) model and considers it in relation to the popular theory. 
Keywords 
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INTRODUCTION 
The concept of outsourcing Information Systems is not new and has been covered at length in the literature over 
the last two decades (Kirk and Jones, 1994; Lacity and Willcocks, 1998, 2001; Stegman, 2003). But outsourcing 
system security is relatively new. The growth of the field of computer systems security in the current 
environment derived its impetus from the impetuous expansion of the Internet in the 1990s. Rigorous security, 
however, was not perceived to be essential in the early days, possibly due to the trusting academic environment 
in which the Internet was conceived and utilized. But the increasing use of commerce by electronic means and 
the high profile that hacking and other types of Internet fraud have assumed, have radically altered that 
perception. The need for both physical and systemic protection of the computer is universally accepted but the 
quality of that protection is still a debatable topic. The advent of an industry devoted to this area has occurred 
during the last few years offering high quality protection services and, therefore, the concept of selective 
outsourcing has, in this area, become a reality. In earlier work (Warren et al., 2005, Wilde et al., 2006) we 
described a Soft System Methodology (SSM) to model the phenomenon of outsourcing security and, as such, we 
have collected a body of data to describe it. The notion underpinning this approach was to incorporate the human 
perspective into a conceptual model of security outsourcing for which SSM is well suited. Basically the data 
reflected the CATWOE part of the SSM framework but was quite comprehensive in this regard. However, in 
reviewing the literature in relation to the outsourcing of Information Systems, it appears that none of the 
theoretical approaches, of which there are many, have mentioned system security. Our objective in this paper is 
briefly to investigate the theoretical background of IS outsourcing and examine it in relation to the data we have 
gathered on IS security outsourcing. 
OUTSOURCING THEORY 
The approach taken by the authors of this paper results from an intuitive classification of outsourcing theory 
literature which has led us to examine it in terms of suitability, advantages and operations. Since the major 
motivation of this paper is to examine a body of data in relation to outsourcing theory and the data comprises 
perspectives towards outsourcing as shown in Figure 1, excluding references to specific cases, we have 
consequently omitted a classifications focusing on results or outcomes. As we have explained later, the data was 
not collected for the purpose of this paper but the classification of suitability, advantages and operations, in fact, 
provides a reasonable degree of fit and thus provides our conceptual framework. There have been many 
contributors to the theoretical debate on outsourcing information systems and the circumstances in which it may 
be successful. These include Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) (Williamson, 1985), Resource Based 
Advantage (RBA) (Barney, 1991), Domberger’s Outsourcing Theory (Domberger, 1998), and Partnership 
Development (Klepper, 1995, Lee and Kim, 1999). Many of these have been combined and analysed; for 
example, Duncan (1998) examined outsourcing in relation to both TCE and RBA. Kern and Willcocks (2001) 
derived a “Relational Advantage: Conceptual Framework” from three theories, interorganisational relationship 
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theory, relational contract theory and TCE. The following sections cover these contributions according to the 
conceptual framework. 
Suitability 
Perhaps the basic theories, which most readily lend themselves to the nature of outsourcing, although with 
reservations, are Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) and Resource Based Advantage (RBA). Williamson (1985) 
sees a firm’s processes as a vertically integrated set, which relate via a suite of easily quantifiable transactions. If 
the service, which the process provides, can be obtained more cheaply from the market than to provide it 
internally, then economics dictates that this should be the case. The economically based TCE was originally a 
justification of the organisation developed from Coase’s work (1937). The premise, to assess the organisational 
value of processes from a transactional point of view, in essence, reduces to the cost of purchasing the service on 
the open market compared to vertically integrating the process into the hierarchical set of processes, clearly 
affects the structure of the organisation with its associated questions of governance. The theory does recognize 
complications. For example, the question of opportunism, which translates into “self-interest with guile”, is 
conceived as a danger. In circumstances of asset specificity, when a second party invests in an asset, which will 
serve only for a single purpose, comprehensive contractual protection is required to preserve the integrity of the 
investment and, in TCE terms, this would increase the price of the transaction. Otherwise, self-interest could 
persuade the initial party, aware of the position of the committed investor, to reduce the ‘rents’ for the asset to 
below a profitable threshold. A further danger is the phenomenon of ‘limited rationality’, which recognizes the 
individual’s constraints in comparing and assessing unreasonable levels of choice.  
TCE has, however, been criticized as an inadequate vehicle by which to gauge the suitability of IS outsourcing. 
To Stegman (2003), perceiving the firm merely as a hierarchy of processes ordered by stage of production 
confuses the selection of processes as suitable for outsourcing by simplifying the firm’s structure. The 
relationships between processes and, therefore, their transactional interactions may be more or less elaborate. 
Earl (1996) concurs in essence, when he states that arguments in favour of outsourcing IT “do not account for 
the complexities that permeate the management of IT resources” (p26). An earlier argument of Alchian and 
Demetz (1972) relates to the concept of integration and rejected the Williamson notion of the firms’ rationale 
being bound in transaction cost related processes since it excludes the dynamics of team production which 
produce a greater output than the parts individually.  
TCE, however, is a theory, which could arguably predict that system security is a suitable candidate for 
outsourcing. According to Aubert and Weber’s (2001) definition of asset specificity, the asset should be 
classified as specialized in that it is not transaction specific in the sense that a single organisation is involved. 
Firstly security systems and equipment are identical or similar between organisations, which has resource 
repercussions referred to later in this section. Secondly there are many organisations offering computer security 
operations, and both of these suggest that transaction costs would be unlike to exceed a threshold where it would 
be more economic to retain the function in-house. 
Resource Based Advantage (Barney, 1991) is the second popular theory applied to outsourcing and suggests that 
organisations derive competitive advantage from imperfectly inimitable or non-substitutable resources. The 
theory further asserts that not all resources are homogeneous neither are they perfectly mobile. Duncan (1998) 
emphasizes that this view is also true in the IT world where resources are particularly volatile, their value is 
heterogeneous across organisations and both of these serve to create an environment of uncertainty. It is the 
unobservable aspects of resources, namely organisational routines; management, knowledge, learning and the 
resultant capabilities (Prahalad and Hamel, 1990) developed by the organisation which are both inimitable and 
frequently non-understandable (Roy and Aubert, 2002) that yield competitive advantage. From the outsourcing 
perspective, Roy and Aubert (2002), in a construct graphing the strategic value of a resource against the 
organisations’ ownership of that resource, contrast two situations. The first, when both the strategic value and the 
organisations’ ownership of the resource are high, the appropriate governance mode is internal. Where both are 
low, the appropriate governance mode is outsourcing. The resources in the case supporting this model are 
knowledge based and, interestingly in the case of IT knowledge, where the strategic value is high but the 
ownership is low, the suggested model is a partnership covered later in this paper. Duncan (1998) had already 
identified that, in an environment of extreme volatility, IT knowledge is a resource that an organisation has 
difficulty in acquiring and maintaining. But she also appreciated its value, in conjunction with a knowledge of 
the business and its environment, in recognizing opportunities and implementing strategic initiatives. Duncan 
therefore sees the dangers in outsourcing IT not least in the eroding of control that occurs in a spiral of 
increasing organisational dependence on the outsource vendor. 
Aubert et al. (2004) justify the classification of IT as a specific asset on the premise that, although IT equipment 
is in many cases identical or at least similar in many organisations, the use to which it put and the expertise 
required to put it to this use is organisation specific. However, their preliminary analysis implied that this did not 
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discourage outsourcing although the theory would predict that this should not be the case. Further analysis 
suggested that cost may be a factor. From a technical viewpoint, hiring and training technicians is both long and 
costly, whereas they are readily available on the open market. Expertise required to implement the use of the 
technology remain important from the point of view of changes. The decision to outsource therefore would 
suggest that costs associated with changes are marginal when compared to the contract value. 
Advantages/Disadvantages 
Domberger (1998) in a general examination of non-IT outsourcing situations identified four advantages, which 
might accrue to successful cases:  
• Specialisation 
“Specialisation leads demonstrable economic benefits. By concentrating on activities in which an 
organisation is relatively more efficient, total value added is maximized. It also facilitates the 
exploitation of scale economies.” (p. 51) 
• Market discipline 
“Market discipline provides a range of benefits, namely, focus by the purchaser on outputs not 
inputs, competition (contestability) between suppliers, choices by purchasers, and innovative work 
practices.” (p. 51) 
• Flexibility  
“Networks of small organisations linked to their clients via contract can adjust more quickly and at 
lower cost to changing demand conditions compared to integrated organisations.” (p. 51) 
• Cost savings  
“International studies show that significant cost savings are achieved by contracting, on average of 
the order of 20%. As a rule, efficiency gains need not lead to lower quality.” (p. 51) 
Seddon et al. (2002) discuss the Domberger theory in relation to IS outsourcing. They conclude that even with 
the Domberger research focusing on a case of refuse collection, the four benefits also seem to apply to IS 
outsourcing. The authors caution, however, that their data was not collected for the purpose of their analysis. 
Earl (1996) is much more skeptical about the value of outsourcing. As well as warning that IS is heavily 
integrated with all aspects of a business, which poses difficulties referred to earlier, Earl alerts his readers to the 
problems of weak management, uncertainty, hidden costs, lack of organisational learning and loss of innovative 
capacity amongst others. The industrial literature, however, focuses heavily upon two of the Domberger benefits, 
cost and specialisation (Blacharski, 2000; Schneier, 2002). 
Operations 
The major theme that runs through the literature regarding operationalisation of the outsourcing agreement is 
governance. Governance stems from TCE in a major sense since the internal and external process management is 
about governance structures and is especially involved in contractual relations (Aubert and Weber, 2001; Aubert 
et al., 2004). But it is also referred to in the sense that “outsourcing can be considered to be a significant 
administrative innovation where there is significant shift in the mode of governance, significant change in the 
internal processes of user organisation, and significant change in the organisational routines used to deal with the 
external environment. In essence, it introduces massive changes in the user organisation” (Palvia, 1995, p266). 
Clearly the quality of the outsourcing agreement is significant as to the type of governance an organisation 
adopts. Differing types of relationships between an organisation and its outsourcing vendor have been 
characterized by Lacity and Willcocks (1998) as fee for service, strategic alliance/partnership and buy-in 
contract and by Klepper and Jones (1998) as market type, intermediate type and partnership type. Indeed, the 
partnership (Klepper, 1995; Lee, 2000) is a popular theme in the outsourcing literature. Klepper, even in 1995, 
points out the concept of the partnership was not new and includes an excellent coverage of the literature of 
partnerships pointing out that most is of a practical rather than a theoretical nature. Typical is the reference to 
Levinthal and Fichman (1988) that the two major ingredients of an enduring and successful partnership are the 
investment in inter-organisational learning over time and trust. Klepper cites a number of models built to 
represent the partnership including a conceptual model for the development of inter-organisational relationships 
(Ring and Van de Ven (1994), and a sequential stage model of partnership development (Dwyer et al., 1987), 
consisting of awareness, exploration, expansion and commitment. A criterion for successful progress through 
these stages is the nature of the relationship as being non-aggressive or controlling (Klepper and Jones, 1998). 
Sargent Jnr (2006) discusses a number of models and critiques that have developed relatively recently. For 
example, Lee and Kim (1999) combined a power political model with a social exchange model identify a set of 
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dynamic, static and contextual factors which influenced a set of partnership quality variables, namely trust, 
business understanding, benefit/risk share, conflict and commitment and suggested a set key activities to enhance 
them. Kern and Willcocks (2001) combined interorganisational relationship theory, relational contract theory 
and transaction cost theory to develop a Relational Advantage Conceptual Framework. ”. 
Lee (2000) asserts that cost-effective access to specialized computing power or system development skill was a 
major driver for outsourcing until 1990, the growth of IS outsourcing in the 1990s results from the acceptance of 
strategic alliance. It is instructive to see that the industrial literature still maintains the original case. But Lee 
considers that the major issue in this era is in building a successful partnership between the customer and the 
provider of IS outsourcing services. Lee considers that a contractual relationship is limiting and as the 
organisations seek a more flexible relationship after realizing this. Lee also asserts that “in recent studies, there 
has been much interest in knowledge sharing through outsourcing partnership and its effect on outsourcing 
success. The knowledge sharing between the service receiver and provider is considered as one of the major 
motives of the outsourcing partnership based on mutual trust  
SECURITY AS AN OUTSOURCEABLE PROCESS 
The suitability of security outsourcing is to our knowledge not covered in the academic literature as an entity in 
itself but heavily covered in the industrial literature. As it is a single part of the IS field of operations, it is clearly 
an example of selective outsourcing. If we consider it from a TCE perspective, it is a process in which 
transactions are relatively simple and, since performance criteria are simple to define, relatively contractually 
inexpensive. From an RBA perspective, the technologies are general and well known so there is little 
opportunity for creating competitive advantage on this basis. From the technology point of view expertise is 
easily available on the open market and expensive to develop in-house. This is to be expected from the tone of 
the industrial literature (Blacharski, 2000; Schneier, 2002). For example, a June survey by Hurwitz Group found 
that as many as a quarter of companies with more than $10 billion in annual sales are using or considering 
handing over some of their security, such as firewalls, antivirus software, virtual private networks, or intrusion 
detection, to a managed security service (Hulme, 2001).  
THE DATA 
The data has been collected from a set of industry practitioners to conform loosely to the SSM methodology and 
the objective was to model the human aspects of a security outsourcing environment from the outsourcing 
organisation’s perspective. The questions were posed to a set of 12 practicing computing professionals who were 
knowledgeable of system security outsourcing with varying levels of experience. There are advantages and 
disadvantages in using data that has been collected for a different purpose. On the negative side important 
questions within the domain might be absent, but on the positive side the difficulties in preparing a fully 
comprehensive questionnaire are irresolvable and an approximation must suffice. In this case, the question we 
are pursuing is whether mining this data sheds any light on the viability of outsourcing computer security from 
the theoretical viewpoint. The respondents were encouraged to provide multiple responses to the questions to 
reflect the scope of their perspectives. This accounts for the frequent references to numbers of responses 
exceeding the number of respondents, which follow. 
The questions are illustrated in Figure 1 and can be subdivided into three types. Firstly, above the horizontal 
bracket is a question that yields only metadata in that it reveals the vantage point from which the contributor is 
viewing the system. It yields no data about the system itself. Secondly, those questions above the central box and 
below the horizontal bracket identify the human element, those in control, those who operate and those who 
benefit from the system. The terms superimposed on the arrows nominate the relationship between participant 
and system. These questions were people oriented in the sense that the responses solicited required the 
identification of individuals or groups of individual. Thirdly, the boxes below the central box show those 
questions that relate to the system itself and identify the functions, constraints and metrics of the system. The 
answers to these questions were extremely broad and as such were able to reflect to a significant extent the 
opinions of the respondents. This enabled us to reclassify and mine the data with the objective of matching the 
responses with the theoretical approaches to IS outsourcing examined above. Respondents were asked to provide 
a perspective from which they derived their responses and of the 10 responses to this question six provided an 
internal perspective, one from the outsourcer’s viewpoint and three indicated a holistic appreciation. We concede 
that since the data was not collected for this purpose the analysis may be incomplete and all areas may not be 
covered consistently. We present the findings in the same sequence as the theory section above. 
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FINDINGS 
Suitability 
The questions as posed exclude a direct enquiry into the viability of outsourcing system security; rather this is 
taken as read. There were no qualified responses in the complete set that suggested that system security is not a 























implications that the cost factors should be beneficial to the company yet even these were few and were limited 
to “business systems run cost effectively”, “must be cost effective”, and “budget, measure original cost vs. new 
cost”. Perhaps the most convincing evidence the contributors provided in favour of suitability is demonstrated in 
a series of responses to the functionality question. These have been classified as ‘objectives’ and include: 
1. “To be able to get a better result based on that specialization 
2. To produce information for management decisions 
3. Protection of data systems 
4. Evaluation and defending against threats 
5. The implementation of policy and practice 
6. Allow internal staff to concentrate on strategic goals 
7. Minimisation of risk.” 
The concept of ‘specialisation’ arises in the first and sixth responses and the general implication is that the 
outsource vendor is qualified to produce a service quality to satisfy them all. From the viewpoint of resources the 
contributors showed no concern about physical resources. For them the requirement for specialized resources 
was not an issue and a plausible explanation is that none are required. On the other hand, the question of 
expertise was of considerable concern. The data was mined from the responses to the question regarding 
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functionality and covers a number of areas. Of the 45 responses to this question two were difficult to classify, 
seven were related to general objectives and have already been covered as indicators of outsourcing feasibility, 
three represented system attributes such as toolset functions and internet access which are of no relevance to this 
paper and two concerned backup procedures. The remaining 31 nominated specific areas of expertise and are 
included in Table 1 
 




1 Robustness 3 Patch levels 
Pro-activity towards new vulnerabilities 
2 Access control 2 Client authentication 
Identify management and access management 
3 Recording and 
analysis 
4 Log and analysis of firewall, Ids and event logs 
Real time analysis of InfoSec infrastructure 
4 Surveillance 
maintenance 
4 Monitoring of security breaches 
Vulnerability monitoring 
5 Intrusion prevention 5 Centralised virus protection 
Perimeter security 
6 Data management 4 System should assist in classification of documents 
Classification of data for escalation 
7 Reporting 4 Audit 
Report improvements in staff knowledge 
8 Effectiveness 
administration  
3 An information service desk 
Business systems run cost effectively 
9 Efficiency 2 A good information flow 
Timeliness 
 Total 31  
Table 1 Identified areas of expertise 
 
Table 1 contains the responses as recorded and the classification is interpretive on the part of the authors. 
Regardless, it is apparent that the expertise that is being purchased includes both technical (as exemplified in 1-5 
above) and administrative (as exemplified in 7-9 above). Data management, as shown in 6 above, is an area that 
may require both internal and external expertise since the classification policy is the organisation’s control whilst 
the outsourcer is expected to implement it.  
In considering these results from the perspective of TCE and RBA, the notion of cost appeared to be 
insignificant in relation to that of resources. However, the resource issue is not one of creating competitive 
advantage from information systems, rather it is one of avoiding the cost of acquiring and maintaining the costs 
in-house. As such it conforms to Roy and Aubert’s (2002) premise that the only way for some organizations to 
gain access to such a resource is to outsource.  
Benefits 
From the viewpoint of benefits, the contributors had very clear ideas about the system requirements and these 
were specified in the question regarding metrics (23 responses) The data included the need for registration of the 
normal measurable phenomena and the incidents expected of such a security system; down time, network 
overhead, volume of SPAM, virus/malware infections, incidents reported/missed/detected, patch levels on 
servers and network devices. Respondents were also concerned with the resolution paths in handling the events 
and levels of access to the outsourcer/response time policy breaches. From the proactive viewpoint the 
performance would include vulnerability and penetration testing. The outsourcer’s expertise would, therefore, 
resulting in the IT security objectives being met by improvements in security, less opportunities for attack and 
reduced risk or exposure to risk. Levels of integration of security practice in the whole organisation would 
increase and the movements of the trends within the organization could be measured. 
But there were multiple reservations about the attainment of benefits, which also impinge on the question of 
governance covered in the next section. These occurred in areas of cost to ensure economy and the requirement 
for audit, which occasioned four responses. The need for information was further highlighted by the need for 
audits and a reporting structure (seven responses) and survey/policy review and regular meetings (three 
responses). This rigorous questioning on the vendors’ services suggested that a contractual role was more 
appropriate than a partnership role (covered next section). 
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Operations 
Governance is overwhelmingly the most frequent concern referred to in the data. Concerns with governance 
were manifold, mentioned in the previous section, and were also very evident in the question relating to 
constraints and these are illustrated in Table 2 
 




1 Administration 8 Systems should not be managed remotely. 
Different or another internal auditor. 
Financial limits on spending or billable hours. 
Good change control procedures, meaning someone 
internally has to sign off on any changes 
2 Environment 1 Geographical – engager may want the presence of the 
outsource company. Where the outsourcer is located. You 
may want the outsourcer to have personnel where you have 
gear. 
3 Management 1 System administration, network administration and 
information security should be in different reporting trees 
4 Perimeter Security 1 Perimeter security should be managed internally 
5 Policy 11 Organisation still takes final responsibility for security. 
The outsourcer should be allowed to implement set policy 
and procedure, within specific guidelines. 
The whole security process should not be outsourced. 
Control should remain internal. 
Do not outsource governance. 
Keep policy and strategy in-house. 
Risk management would not be outsourced. 
Certain systems which are proprietary should not be 
touched by an outsourcer 
6 Prevent 
unauthorised access 
3 Strict access control protocols. 
No remote access or at least limit it.. 
7 Reporting 1 Audit 
Report improvements in staff knowledge 
8 Terms of agreement 15 A strict report regime. 
Confidentiality from the provider. 
Cancellation clause in the contract. 
If Outsourcer needs to work outside their role then the 
management committee would consider their request. 
Must meet contractual agreement. 
Well defined roles responsibilities and accountability. 
SLA – would reflect the extent to which the engaged wants 
the outsourcer to take over the security system. 
Document the exact scope of the system. 
Outsourcer must be subject to KPI. 
 Total 41  
Table 2 Constraints 
 
Table 2 covers the constraint responses in some detail reflecting the importance that the outsourcing 
organisations place upon questions of governance. The classifications are our interpretation and arguably overlap 
but regardless we consider that the contributors’ intent to be transparent. Duplicates have been excluded from 
Table 2, but the large number of responses which pertain to Policy and Terms of Agreement are convincing as 
the importance placed upon the relationship between the outsourcing organization and the vendor. These 
responses were in addition to the responses to the metrics question referred to above some of which were also 
very concerned with retaining control and monitoring the performance of the vendor. These responses are shown 
in Table 3. 
 
Verification of compliance 
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Gauge how they perceive their effectiveness 
Are staff aware of the code of conduct 
Have people signed off on the code of conduct 
Enforcement of legislation. 
Backup criteria with legislation. 
Minimise how much outsourcers get in the way of such goals. 
The level at which the outsourcer enables the business to do what it is mean to do. 
Bonus and penalty system. 
Table 3 Compliance Metrics 
 
The rigorous enquiry into performance stretches into questions of ethics, not only of the vendor but also of the 
understanding of ethics on the part of the organisational staff. Indeed, responses suggesting vendor interference 
into organisational policy and legal non-compliance are hardly complimentary of vendor performance and the 
final entry of Table 2 suggesting sanctions is not supportive of a style of partnership. Lee (2001) states that “The 
strong relationship between partnership quality and outsourcing success indicates that fostering a cooperative 
relationship based on trust, business understanding, benefit and risk sharing, conflict, and commitment is critical 
to maximize the strategic, economic, and technological benefits for outsourcing.” (p332) and there little evidence 
of such sentiments in this data.  
The emphasis as shown by the Policy quotations is strongly in favour of retaining both internal control and risk, 
and suitable selective outsourcing is appropriate. One respondent seemed aware that the vendor should be 
allowed some latitude but generally internal control was seen as crucial, as shown in those comments under 
Terms of Agreement by the Service Level Agreement (SLA), which requires comprehensive documentation of 
the system, as a vehicle to enforce policy. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
We conclude that system security outsourcing is effectively delineated in terms of outsourcing theory relative to 
the data used for this analysis. The clear reservation is that the data was not collected for this purpose but it 
nevertheless illustrates some interesting aspects of the theory. Firstly it conforms well, even if sparsely with the 
concept of TCE, since the economics of the outsourcing market in this area demonstrate that vendor choice and 
associated cost advantage are available. The transactions generated by IS security are not unique or specific to a 
single organization and there is no concept of asset specificity in this application. The clear implication 
according to TCE is, therefore, that outsourcing security in a favourable market environment is potentially 
advantageous. But secondly, and in possible contradiction, RBA illustrates that expertise is a relatively rare 
major resource. The advantage in acquiring this resource, which in other circumstances according to RBA might 
be seen as competitively advantageous, is perceived to be offset by its cost especially in smaller organisations. 
Also, since the scope for using this expertise creatively in security applications is limited, the potential of using 
internal processes and schedules to create distinctive capabilities to yield competitive advantage is consequently 
reduced. This leads to a further contradiction in that the cost benefit of the resource usage resulting from an 
outsourcing arrangement is in contradistinction to the loss of control of both data and process that the 
outsourcing involves. And so thirdly, in terms of governance, which is a topic both relevant to TCE and RBA the 
concept of partnership in simply unacceptable to the respondents, with control to be kept in-house with rigorous 
scrutiny of the vendor to enforce compliance. However, from the perspective of the Domberger advantages, the 
cost and specialization benefits seem to accrue whilst the market place discipline and flexibility benefits were 
not demonstrated. In further work, it would be instructive to conduct a similar analysis from more specific data 
and extend the theory base to a greater range of models. 
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